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Effects of Fiscal R&D Incentives on R&D Expenditure
Anna Theresa Bührle
Universität Mannheim
Abstract
Special tax incentives aiming to foster research and development (R&D) investment are widely spread among the members
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED). I investigate the effect such tax incentives have
on business R&D investment. Fiscal R&D incentives can be categorized as input-oriented tax incentives such as tax credits,
super deductions and accelerated depreciation, and as output-oriented incentives such as patent box regimes. In the first part
of my thesis I provide an overview over the methodology of the B-Index, a measure for the generosity of input-oriented tax
incentives. Calculations of the B-Index for 33 OECD-countries and China from 1991 to 2014 show an overall trend towards
an increase in the generosity of input-oriented fiscal R&D incentives. In the second part of my thesis, I create a panel with
country-level data on business R&D investment provided by the OECD. I test reactions to changes in R&D tax incentives and
find a positive effect of input-oriented R&D tax incentives, but no significant impact of output-oriented R&D tax incentives.
A more detailed analysis on the industry-level shows that the results are driven by effects on business R&D investment in the
manufacturing and services sector.
Keywords: R&D, tax incentives, B-Index, taxation, OECD
1. Introduction
Research and development (R&D) investment does not
only create advantages for the investing companies, but also
for the public through so-called technological spillovers.1
However, empirical evidence shows that business R&D ex-
penditure is below the social optimum. Reasons for that are
externalities that influence the profitability of the R&D in-
vestment.2 Therefore, to profit from the knowledge spillover
effects, governments have an incentive to stimulate private
R&D investment. While direct funding like government
grants and subsidies decreased over the past few decades,
the generosity of indirect support via fiscal R&D incentives
increased.3 More and more countries started to introduce
input-oriented fiscal incentives to promote R&D investment.
In recent years, output-oriented fiscal R&D incentives also
grew in popularity.
This thesis serves two purposes. Firstly, it aims to make
the data on R&D incentives and on the B-Indices, which mea-
sure the generosity of input-oriented R&D incentives, avail-
able for other researchers. Data on the total B-Index has been
1See e.g. Griliches (1992), pp. 43-44.
2See e.g. Nelson (1959), p. 304, Arrow (1962), pp. 616-619.
3See Westmore (2013), p. 11.
published by the OECD for individual years. Ernst and Spen-
gel (2011) give an overview over R&D tax incentives and to-
tal B-Indices for 20 European countries between 1998 and
2007. Thomson (2013) presents background data and mea-
sures separated by type of cost for 26 OECD countries for
the period 1980-2006. This thesis continues this work and
provides the B-Indices for an extended country sample and
updated period of time as well as all formulas and variables
used for the calculations. In this first part, a qualitative analy-
sis is conducted, investigating the development of fiscal R&D
incentives. Secondly, this thesis also extends the existing em-
pirical research on the effectiveness of the tax measures. The
quantitative analysis executed in the second part uses empir-
ical methods and includes a cross-country study on the ef-
fect of fiscal R&D incentives on R&D investment in different
industries. Existing empirical studies mainly investigate the
effect of the introduction of fiscal R&D incentives within one
country; studies that include several countries, observation
years and types of tax incentives are rare.4
The structure is as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview
over the main types of fiscal input- as well as output-oriented
R&D incentives. In addition, the B-Index as a measure for the
4Please refer to chapter 4.1 for examples of cross-country studies.
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generosity of input-oriented R&D incentives is introduced. In
chapter 3, the existing fiscal R&D incentives for 33 OECD
countries and China for the period from 1991 to 2014 are
displayed and qualitatively analyzed. Chapter 4 gives a brief
review on previous studies on the effects of the B-Index on
R&D investment. This is followed by the introduction of data
used in the quantitative analysis and the results of the empir-
ical study. The last chapter concludes.
2. Fiscal R&D incentive models: Basic concepts
2.1. Input-oriented R&D tax incentives
Legislators use different ways to implement tax incentives
to promote R&D. Input- oriented incentives target a com-
pany’s R&D investment and reduce the marginal costs of the
R&D projects. They take the form of tax credits, super deduc-
tions (also referred to as enhanced or extra allowances) or
accelerated depreciation. As of 2014, 29 of the 34 countries
included in this thesis provide at least one of those incentive
schemes.5
Tax credits reduce a company’s tax liability. A predefined
percentage of the R&D expenditure incurred can be directly
offset against the tax due. Super deductions and accelerated
depreciation on the other hand reduce a company’s tax base.
In case of the super deduction, an enhanced allowance on
top of the usually deductible amount of expenditure can be
claimed. Under this scheme, e.g. in the Czech Republic the
tax base can be reduced by up to double of the amount of
costs incurred. With accelerated depreciation, the deprecia-
tion rates for fixed R&D assets are enhanced. The capitalized
expenditure can be deducted faster, which leads to a lower
tax base in the affected periods.6
A special form of fiscal R&D incentive applies to the wage
withholding tax for R&D personnel. The wage withholding
tax payable by the employer is lowered. The company still
withholds the full tax amount from its employees wage pay-
ments, but pays only a fraction to the state. As a result, the
R&D labor costs for the company are reduced.7
The R&D tax incentives mentioned above are calculated
based either on current costs, or on capital expenditure, or
both. Current costs include labor expenditure and other cur-
rent costs, such as expenditure on consumable material. Cap-
ital expenditure is composed of expenditure on machinery
and equipment and expenditure on buildings. Some coun-
tries do not allow for the expenditure to be included at once.
Instead, they only allow to add the depreciation costs to the
basis. In general, acquisition cost for land is not allowed to
be included in the basis for any of the observed tax incentive
schemes.
5Germany, Mexico and New Zealand currently do not have or revoked
previously existing input- oriented tax incentive schemes. Denmark and
Poland offer restricted R&D incentives that are only applicable to a limited
range of companies fulfilling certain conditions.
6See CPB et al. (2014), p. 50.
7See Ernst and Spengel (2011), p. 8.
Another feature of the tax incentives is their link to either
the volume or the increment of R&D expenditure. In case of
a scheme based on volume, the incentive applies to the total
amount of R&D expenditure incurred by a company. In con-
trast, incremental schemes aim at increases of the company’s
R&D expenditure. If an incremental scheme is applied, com-
panies can only profit from a tax reduction if the expenditure
in the current period exceeds a base amount. The definition
of this base amount differs from scheme to scheme. E.g. Ire-
land allows a tax credit for R&D expenditure exceeding the
R&D expenditure of the company in the fixed base year 2003.
Other countries like Australia, Greece and Japan calculate a
moving average of the R&D expenditure of up to five previ-
ous years. At times, the USA offered three mutually exclusive
credit regimes, each with its own definition for the relevant
base amount.8
Part of the fiscal R&D incentives are also limited by floors
and/or caps. In the first case, tax relief is only granted if the
R&D expenditure exceeds a certain value (e.g. for the Finnish
super deduction EUR 15,000). In the second case, fiscal R&D
incentives are capped at a certain value (e.g. for the Italian
tax credit in 2010 EUR 50 million) or limited by a percentage
of the tax liability (e.g. for the Japanese tax credit from 1991
to 1998 10% of tax due before the credit).
Some of the R&D tax incentives differentiate depending
on firm size; e.g. smaller companies benefit from more gen-
erous rates or the scheme is limited to enterprises that meet
certain employment or turnover criteria.
2.2. B-Index: Definition and methodology
To calculate the generosity of input-oriented R&D tax in-
centives, the OECD9 calculates tax subsidy rates based on the
benefit cost ratio at which an R&D investment opportunity
becomes viable after tax (B-Index).10 Several studies also
rely on the B-Index as a measure for R&D tax support.11 The
measure represents the tax component of the user cost of cap-
ital which was introduced by Jorgenson (1963). McFetridge
and Warda (1983) adapted the user cost of capital to R&D in-
vestment and introduced the B-Index model. As a marginal
concept, the B-Index is an indicator for marginal investment
decisions, e.g. the scope of an investment (as opposed to
discrete investment decisions, e.g. a corporation’s location
decision).12
The B-Index model is limited to the corporate income tax
regime, i.e. personal income taxes and several other taxes
that might apply as well as grants and subsidies are disre-
garded. It is also assumed that the companies generate suffi-
cient taxable income to fully utilize the R&D tax incentives in
the current year (no tax exhaustion); therefore carry-forward
8See Taxand (2009), pp. 29-32 for a short overview over the three
schemes.
9See OECD (2017).
10See Warda (2001), p. 192.
11See e.g. Falk (2006), Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2010), Ernst and
Spengel (2011), Westmore (2013), Bösenberg and Egger (2017).
12See Bösenberg and Egger (2017), p. 43.
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or carry-back provisions do not apply. In addition, the cor-
porate income tax rates and incentives applicable to the top
eligible income are considered. Ceilings and floors that limit
the claim on R&D tax incentives are disregarded for reasons
of simplicity.13
The measure is calculated as the net present value (NPV)
of income which covers the initial R&D investment and
taxes:14
b =
1− A
1−τ (1)
with τ= corporate income tax rate
A= NPV of all R&D incentives applicable
A consists of the sum of the individual NPVs (An) of four
types of R&D costs: current costs which are sub-divided into
labor (AL) and other current costs (AOC) and capital expen-
diture which is sub-divided into machinery and equipment
(AME) and buildings (AB):
A=
∑
wn∗An =WL∗AL+wOC∗AOC+wME∗AME+wB∗AB (2)
with wn = weight attributed to expenditure type n
wL = weight attributed to labor costs
wOC = weight attributed to other current costs
wME = weight attributed to machinery and equipment costs
wB = weight attributed to costs for buildings
Each An is a combination of the NPVs of the depreciation
of the expenditure as well as the NPVs of the tax credits, super
deductions and reductions of wage withholding tax that are
available in addition:
An = d
n
d ∗ and + dntc ∗ antc + dnsd ∗ ansd + dnwwt ∗ anwwt (3)
with dnd = weight attributed to expenditure type n
dnd = value of expenditure subject to depreciation in t=0
dtc = value of expenditure subject to tax credit in t=0
dsd = value of expenditure subject to super deduction in t=0
dnwwt = value of expenditure subject to wage withholding tax
tax reduction in t=0
and = NPV depreciation
antc = NPV tax credit
ansd = NPV super deduction
anwwt = NPV wage withholding tax reduction
The value of d equals 1 if the tax incentive is calculated
based on the full amount of the expenditure. In case of R&D
expenditure on machinery and equipment or buildings, R&D
13See Warda (2001), p. 193-194.
14See Warda (2001), p. 192.
tax incentives can be calculated based on the amount of the
depreciation instead. Then, d is calculated as follows:
dSLd =
1
T
∗ [1− ( 1
1+ r
)T ] ∗ 1+ r
r
(4)
dDBd = d ∗ (1+ r)d + r (5)
with dSLd = d, if the basis is the depreciation of assets with
a straight-line schedule
dDBd = d, if the basis is the depreciation of assets with
a declining-balance schedule
r = discount rate
T = useful life of asset
The respective values for the NPVs of the depreciation
and input-oriented tax incentives are each calculated based
on the individual regulations in place.
The NPV of the depreciation, and , equals 1 if the expen-
diture can be immediately deducted (which applies to the
majority of countries for current costs15). If the R&D expen-
diture has to be capitalized, the straight-line or the declining-
balance method are possible. The formulas assume that as-
sets are depreciated at the beginning of the period.
aSLd =
1
T
∗ [1− ( 1
1+ r
)T ] ∗ 1+ r
r
∗τ (6)
aDBd = d ∗ (1+ r)d + r ∗τ (7)
with aSLd = NPV straight-line depreciation
aDBd = NPV declining-balance depreciation
Tax credits are either granted before taxes, and therefore
subject to corporate taxation (e.g. Canada), or after taxes
(e.g. Austria):
anon−taxtc = tc (8)
ataxtc = tc ∗ (1−τ) (9)
15Only in a few countries research and/or development costs cannot be
immediately expensed. For example in the Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland
or Portugal the capitalization of R&D expenditure is mandatory if certain
conditions are fulfilled. In the Netherlands, Slovak Republic only develop-
ment expenditure is subject to mandatory capitalization. Other countries
like Greece, Italy and Luxembourg allow an option, while R&D costs are
regarded as non-capitalisable in Austria and Germany. See Endres et al.
(2007), pp. 291-295.
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with anon−taxtc = NPV non-taxable tax credit
ataxtc = NPV taxable tax credit
tc = tax credit rate
The super deduction directly reduces the taxable in-
come:16
asd = sd ∗τ (10)
with sd = super deduction rate
If the tax credit or super deduction is based on an in-
cremental scheme with a k-period moving average as a base
for the increase in R&D expenditure, the respective NPVs are
multiplied by the following:17
1− 1
k
K∑
k=1
(1+ r)−k (11)
with K = number of periods used for calculation of average
In case of the reduction of the wage withholding tax, the
rate does not reduce the payment of corporate income taxes,
but wage withholding taxes instead:
awwt = wwt ∗τwwt (12)
with wwt = reduction rate wage withholding tax
τwwt = wage withholding tax rate
The preceding formulas rest on the assumption that the
investment is financed by retained earnings.18
2.3. Output-oriented R&D tax incentives
In contrast to the types of R&D tax incentives discussed
in the preceding paragraph, states also aim to foster innova-
tion by influencing the taxation of the output of R&D pro-
cesses. From 1973 until 2010, Ireland exempted patent roy-
alty income for domestic R&D.19 As of 2014, 8 out of the 34
countries considered in this thesis offer a so-called intellec-
tual property (IP) box20 that provides a reduced tax rate on
the income generated through the exploitation of successful
innovations in the form of patents.21 Other research activity
which cannot be patented but may generate higher spillover
effects is not rewarded.22 The national regimes differ with
respect to qualifying IP and income as well as the treatment
16In 2006, Belgium introduced a notional interest deduction (NID)
regime. The NID rates are included in the B-Index similarly to the calcu-
lation of a super deduction.
17See Bloom et al. (2002), p. 5, Thomson (2013), p. 4.
18See Ernst and Spengel (2011), p. 18.
19See IBFD (1991-2004), IBFD (2005-2014).
20Comparable regimes are also referred to as patent, innovation or knowl-
edge development box.
21See IBFD (1991-2004), IBFD (2005-2014).
22See Alstadsæter et al. (2015) p. 3.
of past and current R&D expenditure. The application of IP
boxes can lead to a substantial reduction of the cost of capital
of the R&D investment, therefore making it more favorable
than a comparable financial investment. 23
Empirical evidence suggests that output-oriented R&D in-
centives impact the number and location of patents rather
than the amount of R&D expenditure.24 Until today, an effect
on R&D investment could not be empirically confirmed.25
Therefore, IP boxes and their specific design will not be ad-
dressed in detail in this thesis.
3. Fiscal R&D incentive schemes in the OECD
3.1. Overview over existing input- and output-oriented R&D
incentives
This chapter presents an overview over existing systems
and a qualitative analysis across countries and time. Within
the OECD, a magnitude of fiscal R&D incentives are in place.
Table 1 and Table 2 give an overview over the input- respec-
tive output-oriented R&D incentives that are or were avail-
able from 1991-2014 in 33 OECD countries and China. For
the purpose of this thesis, only incentives that are available
to all firms are included. Incentives aimed solely on SMEs are
not considered, and in case of different rates the top rates are
applied. Floors and caps are disregarded.
The information displayed in Table 1 originates from var-
ious sources. The major part was derived from the IBFD
(1991-2004) and the IBFD Country Analyses. The data was
completed and verified with research results from Ernst and
Spengel (2011) and Thomson (2013) as well as with the
global guides from the OECD (OECD (2013), OECD (2015)),
EY (EY (2010),EY (2013), EY (2014)), PwC (PwC (2012),
PwC (2014), PwC (2016)), Deloitte (Deloitte (2011), De-
loitte (2012), Deloitte (2014)), Taxand (Taxand (2009),
Taxand (2011)) and various national sources.
In the column “Capitalization of R&D expenditure” only
countries are shown were research as well as development
expenditure are subject to mandatory capitalization without
further requirements like e.g. special cost documentation.
In the columns “Tax Credit” and “Super Deduction”, italic
and bracketed crosses represent the less favorable scheme
if a country offers several mutually exclusive R&D tax incen-
tives. A more detailed version of Table 1 can be found in the
appendix (Table A - 1).
In 1991, 17 out of 34 countries had input-oriented incen-
tive schemes implemented. Six countries offered tax credits,
three super deduction and eleven accelerated depreciation.
In 2014, in 29 out of 34 countries fiscal R&D incentives are
available. The number of countries offering tax credits (now
23See Evers et al. (2015), p. 514.
24See e.g. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014),
Bradley/Dauchy/Robinson (2015).
25See also De Rassenfosse (2015), p. 15, Alstadsæter et al. (2015), pp.
2-3.
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Table 1: Input-oriented R&D incentives in the OECD, 1991-2014; Source: IBFD (1991-2004), IBFD (2005-2014), Thomson
(2013), Ernst and Spengel (2011), own research.
(1) For Canada and Switzerland only incentives on the state level are taken into account. On the provincial/cantonal level, additional incentives exist.
(2) Estonia introduced a distribution tax system in 2000. For the purposes of the calculations, immediate distribution (and therefore taxation) of profits was
assumed. Depreciation of machinery and equipment as well as buildings was modeled as a 100% write-off in the first year.
Coun- Year Capitalisation Tax Credit Super Deduction Acc. Depr. Reduction
try of R&D exp. Vol. Incr. Vol. Incr. WWT
AT 1991-1999 x
2000-2005 x x
2006-2010 x (x) (x)
2011-2014 x
AU 1991-1995 x x
1996-2000 x
2001-2011 x x
2012-2014 x
BE 1991-2005 x x
2006 x x x
BE 2007-2014 (x) x x x
CA(1) 1991-2013 x x
2014 x
CH(1) 1991-2014
CL 2013-2014 x x
CN 2008-2014 x
CZ 2005-2013 x
2014 x x
DE 1991-2014
DK 1991 10 yrs x
1992-1997 x
EE 1993-1999 5 yrs
2000-2014 x(2)
ES 1991-2014 x x x
FI 1991-2012 x
2013-2014 x x
FR 1991-2003 x
2004-2007 x x
2008-2014 x
GB 1991-2001 x
2002-2012 x x
2013-2014 x (x) x
GR 1991-2004 x
2005-2012 x x
2013-2014 x x
HU 1991-1996 x
1997-2004 x x
2005-2011 x x x
2012-2014 x x
(Continued)
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Table 1—continued
Coun- Year Capitalisation Tax Credit Super Deduction Acc. Depr. Reduction
try of R&D exp. Vol. Incr. Vol. Incr. WWT
IE 1991-2003 x
2004-2014 x x x
IL 1994-2014 x
IS 2011-2014 x
IT 2007-2009 x
2010 x x
2011-2014 x
JP 1991-2002 x
JP 2003-2014 x (x)
KR 1991-1997 x x
1998-2014 (x) x
LU 1998-2014 x
MX 1991-1996 x
1997-2001 x x
2002-2009 x x
NL 1991-1993 5 yrs
1994-2006 5 yrs x
2007-2011 x
2012-2014 x x
NO 2003-2014 x
NZ 2009 x
PL 1991-2014
PT 1997-2003 x x
2005-2014 x x
SE 1991-2014
SI 1994-2001 x
2006-2008 x
2009-2014 x x
SK 1991-2014
US 1991-2014 x
16 countries) and super deductions (now nine countries) in-
creased considerably while the amount of accelerated depre-
ciation remained nearly the same (now twelve countries).
Two countries also implemented an incentive targeting wage
withholding taxes (Belgium and the Netherlands). Only five
out of the 34 countries observed (Switzerland26, Germany,
Poland, Sweden and the Slovak Republic) never offered any
kind of input-oriented R&D incentive.
In most countries, R&D tax incentives were subject to sev-
eral adjustments over the observed period of time. In Bel-
26For Canada and Switzerland only incentives on the state level are taken
into account. On the provincial/ cantonal level, additional incentives exist.
gium, Spain and Korea the rate and basis applicable were
changed up to eight times since the introduction of the re-
spective schemes. Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Nor-
way and the USA on the other hand show more stability in
their R&D incentive tax system. In those countries the input-
oriented incentive schemes lasted more than ten years before
changes were made.
In general, fiscal R&D incentives grew more popular over
the years. Regarding the design and continuity of the input-
oriented R&D incentive schemes a great variety can be ob-
served in the sample.
The data on IP box regimes in Table 2 was mainly com-
piled from the IBFD country analyses and Evers et al. (2015).
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Table 2: Output-oriented R&D incentives in the OECD, 1991-2014; Source: IBFD (1991-2004), IBFD (2005-2014), Evers
et al. (2015), own research.
Country Year Incentive
BE 2007-2014 80% reduction of tax base
ES 2008-2014 60% reduction of tax base
FR 2000-2010 15.495% tax rate
2011-2014 16.245% tax rate
HU 2003-2014 50% reduction of tax base
IE 1973-2010 0% tax rate
LU 2008-2014 80% reduction of tax base
NL 2007-2009 10% tax rate
2010-2014 5% tax rate
PT 2014 50% reduction of tax base
GB 2013-2014 10% tax rate
The introduction of output-oriented R&D incentives
mainly started post-millennial; the systems grew in popu-
larity over the years. As of 2014, eight of 34 countries offer
regimes with significantly reduced tax rates or a reduction of
the tax base for eligible intellectual property income. Ireland
stands out as the only country which discontinued its system
where eligible income was fully tax exempt; it was in place
from 1973 until 2010.
3.2. Overview of B-Index
As already mentioned in chapter 2.2, the B-Index serves
as a quantitative measure of the generosity of the R&D tax
incentive system of a country. Table 3 shows the values of
the B-Indices for all the years and countries considered in
this thesis27
The B-Index is calculated based on the formulas listed in
chapter 2.2 and the data on input-oriented R&D incentives
displayed in Table 1.28 The discount rate is held fixed at 10%
across all countries and years.29 The cost types are weighted
with wL=0.6, wOC=0.3 , wME=0.05 and wB=0.05. This stan-
dard is commonly used for the calculation of the B-Index30
and is a simplification of the weights determined in indus-
trial surveys.31 It is assumed that the R&D investments are
conducted in-house in the resident country of the corpora-
tions. R&D incentives available on a sub-national level32 or
27Table A - 4 in the appendix shows the components of the B-Index at-
tributable to the separate expenditure types.
28A more detailed version of Table 1 is displayed in the appendix (Table A -
1). Please also refer to the appendix for the depreciation schedules (Table A
- 2) and the corporate income tax rates (Table A - 3) used for the calculation.
29This is consistent with Warda (2001), p.193 and Thomson (2013), p.
5.This is consistent with Warda (2001), p.193 and Thomson (2013), p. 5.
30See e.g. Warda (2001), p. 189, Ernst and Spengel (2011), p. 29, Thom-
son (2013), p. 4.
31See e.g. Cameron (1996), p. 216.
32This is relevant in the case of Canada and Switzerland, where some of
the states respective cantons provide fiscal R&D incentives in addition to
incentive schemes on the national level.
subject to size limits, i.e. fiscal incentives aimed at SMEs, are
not modeled. As for the depreciation schedules, if no specific
rules apply straight-line depreciation with a useful life of 7
years for machinery and equipment and 40 years for build-
ings was assumed.
3.3. Qualitative analysis
As the B-Index measures the generosity of a country’s
R&D tax system, it reflects the changes in the input-oriented
R&D incentives, depreciation rules and tax rates. A B-Index
of 1 implies that a corporation has to generate 1 unit of
before-tax income to break even for the additional invest-
ment. For values greater than 1, companies have to earn
more income than the 1 unit invested to compensate for the
tax burden. If the B-Index lies below 1, the favorable tax
treatment leads to a situation where a corporation has to earn
less than the initial investment to break even.33 E.g. in 2003,
a German company would have had to earn EUR 1.03 mil-
lion to offset an additional R&D investment of EUR 1 million
while an Austrian company only would have had to generate
EUR 0.88 million to break even.
In Figure 1, the mean values of the B-Indices, differenti-
ated by the four cost types (machinery and equipment (ME),
buildings (B), labor (L), other current costs (OC)) are dis-
played.34 The B-Indices concentrate on the fiscal R&D incen-
tives relevant for the respective cost type, as the majority of
incentive schemes do not apply to all R&D expenditure in-
curred by a company.
Overall, the B-Indices drop considerably over time. The
total mean value decreases by 0.15 from 0.99 in 1991 to 0.84
in 2014.
The mean B-Indices for buildings show substantially
higher values compared to every other cost type. For build-
ings, the mean amounts to 1.35 in 1991 while the mean for
33See Warda (2001), p. 190.
34For the underlying values, please refer to Table 3 in the preceding chap-
ter and Table A - 4 in the appendix.
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Table 3: Total B-Indices in the OECD, 1991-2014; Source: Own calculations.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AT 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.88 0.88
AU 0.72 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.87
BE 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
CA 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83
CH 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
CL 1.01 1.01 1.01
CN 1.02 1.02
CZ 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
DE 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03
DK 1.18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
EE 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00
ES 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.48 0.69 0.69
FI 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
FR 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92
GB 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90
GR 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01
HU 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.81 0.81 0.81
IE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
IL 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00
IS 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01
IT 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
JP 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.98
KR 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
LU 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01
MX 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.55
NL 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04
NO 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
NZ 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
PL 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02
PT 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.65 0.66
SE 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
SI 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
SK 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02
US 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AT 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
AU 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.48 0.48 0.48
BE 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.60
CA 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.88
(Continued)
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Table 3—continued
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
CH 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
CL 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.65 0.66
CN 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
CZ 1.02 1.02 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.77
DE 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
DK 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
EE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ES 0.69 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
FI 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.81 0.86
FR 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.79 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
GB 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
GR 1.01 1.01 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.64 0.64
HU 0.81 0.84 0.77 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.80 0.80 0.80
IE 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81
IL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
IS 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
IT 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.71 0.71 0.71
JP 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
KR 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.77 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
LU 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
MX 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
NL 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.02 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.88
NO 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
NZ 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.82 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
PL 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
PT 0.66 1.01 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47
SE 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
SI 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.80 0.81 0.81
SK 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
US 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
machinery and equipment amounts to 1.05 at the same point
in time. The main reason for this are the unfavorable depre-
ciation rules for buildings, as the majority of countries limits
the annual depreciation to a depreciation time over ten to 50
years. Only six out of 34 countries grant accelerated depreci-
ation for buildings at some point in time. Here the applicable
useful life varies between five years or immediate deduction.
Because the B-Index formula also relies on the concept of the
time value of money, depreciation expenditure is worth more
the sooner it is deductible from the tax base. Therefore, the
longer the government sets the period of time over which
the invested amount has to be depreciated, the higher the
resulting B-Index (and the more expensive the investment)
gets. In general, the useful life of buildings determined for
tax purposes decreased over the years. This results in declin-
ing B-Indices. In addition, only twelve out of 34 countries
grant input-oriented fiscal R&D incentive schemes that ap-
ply to the full expenditure or the depreciation on buildings.
Eight of those countries introduced their regimes after 2001,
leading to a further decline in the mean value of the B-Index
for buildings. Overall, the B-Index drops from 1.35 in 1991
to 1.15 in 2014.
For machinery and equipment, the R&D incentive regimes
are more favorable. 15 out of 34 countries allow for deprecia-
tion over three years up to immediate deduction, as opposed
to normal schedules with a useful life between three to 20
years. Here, input-oriented R&D incentives are available in
21 out of 34 countries. The majority of the regimes (15 of 21)
A. T. Bührle / Junior Management Science 3(2) (2018) 57-7966
Figure 1: Development of B-Indices by cost type in the OECD, 1991-2014; Source: Own presentation.
was introduced after 2001, resulting in a decreasing mean B-
Index in the subsequent years. In 2014, the mean B-Index for
machinery and equipment amounts to 0.93 compared to 1.05
in 1991.
Considered over the whole time period, the mean B-
Indices for labor and other current costs are always located
below the 1.00-line. Only three countries require mandatory
capitalization for R&D costs in the earlier years of the sam-
ple; from 2007 onwards this expenditure can be immediately
deducted.35 With 25 out of 34 countries offering fiscal R&D
incentives, the majority of the regimes do not differentiate
between labor and other current costs but do apply to cur-
rent costs in general. However, in particular since 2006 the
two curves disentangle. In 2005, the mean B-Indices for
labor and other current costs are equal, nine years later the
mean B-Index for labor amounts to 0.04 less than the mean
B-Index for other current costs. The main reason for this
development are the introduction of the wage withholding
tax reduction in Belgium in 2006, the limitation of the Italian
tax credit to R&D wages in 2012 and the introduction of the
super deduction for R&D wages in Finland from 2013 on-
wards. Altogether, the B-Indices follow the trend of declining
values with a B-Index for current costs of 0.97 in 1991 and
B-Indices for labor and other current costs of 0.81 and 0.85
in 2014.
Figure 2 shows the development of the total B-Indices of
the sample considered in this thesis.36 Although it is diffi-
cult to differentiate the development of the B-Index of an
individual country in the graph, Figure 2 gives an impres-
sion of the diversity of input-oriented fiscal R&D tax incen-
35Please refer to chapter 2.2, footnote 15 for further information about the
capitalization of R&D expenditure and the assumptions made in this thesis.
36For the underlying values, please refer to Table 3 in the preceding chap-
ter.
tives across time as well as across countries. The volatility of
the B-Indices reflects the variety of the underlying R&D tax
regimes.
Only ten out of 34 countries remain in the area with a B-
Index equal to or above 1. The five countries that do not of-
fer any fiscal R&D incentives (Switzerland, Germany, Poland,
Sweden and the Slovak Republic) account for half. Denmark,
Estonia, Israel and Luxembourg offer accelerated deprecia-
tion schedules for R&D assets which reduce the B-Index down
to 1 if the assets can be immediately depreciated. As there are
no other input-related R&D incentives available, the respec-
tive B-Indices do not drop below the 1.00-line. In the case
of the US a tax credit is available for the full period of time,
but according to the calculations this tax advantage does not
fully compensate for the disadvantages of the applicable de-
preciation schedules. If the ten countries in the top are ex-
cluded, the mean value of the total B-Index descends sharply
by 0.2 from 0.97 in 1991 (compared to 0.99) to 0.77 in 2014
(compared to 0.84).
In all the other countries offering tax credits, super de-
ductions or wage withholding tax reductions corporations
benefit from a favorable tax treatment where the break-even
point lies below the initial investment of 1. Depending on the
generosity of the fiscal R&D incentive schemes, the B-Indices
range between 0.97 and 0.47.
In the following, selected countries will be considered
more in detail. Figure 3 depicts the development of the total
B-Index in Portugal, Australia and France.
The graph clearly reflects the tax policy changes in Portu-
gal over the years. Depreciation schedules remain constant
over the whole period. In 1997, the tax rate was reduced
from 39.6% to 37.4%. In addition, a new tax credit scheme
was introduced with a volume credit of 8% and an incre-
mental credit of 30% on current costs. This lead to a drop
in the B-Index from 1.02 to 0.83. Subsequent reductions in
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Figure 2: Development of B-Indices (total) in the OECD, 1991-2014; Source: Own presentation.
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Figure 3: Development of B-Indices (total) in selected countries, 1991-2014; Source: Own presentation.
the corporate income tax rate to 35.2% in 2000 resulted in
a slight increase to 0.84. In 2001, the tax credit rates were
increased to 20% and 50%, resulting in a B-Index of 0.65.
Further reductions of the corporate income tax rate to 33%
in 2002 slightly increased the B-Index to 0.66. A high peak in
2004 (B-Index: 1.01) marks the reduction of the tax rate to
27.5%. and the abolishment of the tax credit regime. A simi-
lar scheme, now expanded to expenditure on machinery and
equipment, reduced the B-Index again to the former level at
0.66. In 2007, the tax rate further decreased to 26.5% (B-
Index: 0.67). In the following years, increases in corporate
income tax rates (from 28.5% in 2011 to 31.5% from 2012
onwards) and tax credit rates (32.5% and 50% in 2010) let
the B-Index decline to a value of 0.47 for 2012 to 2014. This
makes the Portuguese tax credit in its form from 2012 on-
wards the most generous fiscal R&D incentive regime in all
countries and years considered in this thesis.
Over the time period observed, the depreciation rates for
machinery and equipment in Australia were subject to small
changes in 1996 and 2007, which had no considerable effect
on the B-Index. This is due to the assumed cost structure,
as depreciation of machinery and equipment and deprecia-
tion of buildings only account for 5% each in the B-Index
formula. From 1991 to 1997, Australia had a volume incen-
tive scheme in place with a super deduction of 50% on cur-
rent costs and the expenditure on machinery and equipment.
Tax rate changes in 1993 (from 39% to 33%) and 1995 (from
33% to 36%) caused variations in the B-Index from 0.72 to
0.79 to 0.76. In 1997, the super deduction rate was cut in
half to 25%, resulting in a jump in the B-Index by 0.13 to
0.89. A tax rate reduction in 2000 from 36% to 34% further
increased the value to 0.9. The tax rate was again reduced
in 2001 to 30%, but at the same time a 75% incremental
regime was added to the super deduction, overcompensat-
ing for the tax rate change and setting the B-Index to 0.87.
The B-Indices remained stable over the following years, until
in 2012 the super deduction regime was abandoned and a tax
credit scheme was introduced. The 40% tax credit resulted
in a reduction of the B-Index down to 0.48.
In other countries where a super deduction regime was
replaced by a tax credit scheme (Austria in 2006, Belgium in
2007, United Kingdom in 2013) the B-Index stayed constant
or increased slightly. Therefore the substantial reduction in
the Australian case cannot be generalized. Whether or not a
super deduction regime is more or less favorable than a tax
credit regime always depends on the design of the regimes
before and after the change with regards to basis, rate and
additional factors like the tax rates.
At first sight, France differs from all other countries in the
sample. It is the only country where the development of the
B-Indices shows a slight upwards trend, as displayed in Fig-
ure 3. The figure indicates three major changes. From 1991
to 2003, France applied an incremental tax credit regime
with a 50% rate for current costs and the depreciation on
machinery and equipment and buildings. In 2004, the tax
credit was divided into a volume part of 5% and an incremen-
tal part of 45%, leading to a drop in the B-Index from 0.92 to
0.85. The tax credit rate change from 5% to 10% and 45% to
40% in 2006 further decreased the B-Index to 0.79. In 2008,
an exclusively volume-based scheme was introduced. Under
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the new regime, companies can claim a 30% tax credit for ex-
penditure up to EUR 100 million, above this threshold a 5%
tax credit is available. Due to the assumptions made when
calculating the B-Indices, the 5% rate is applied here,37 thus
leading to an increased B-Index of 0.94. If the 30% rate were
applied, the value of the B-Index from 2008 to 2014 would
amount to 0.55, thus following the overall downwards trend
throughout the sample.
As can be seen from the precedent examples, changes in
the tax rate have a small impact on the B-Index. Decreasing
tax rates lead to slightly increasing B-Indices and vice versa.
A possible explanation could be that the value of the output-
oriented fiscal R&D incentives decreases with decreasing tax
rates. For example in case of a double deduction, at a 40%
tax rate a company saves 40 cents on every dollar invested.
If the tax rate is reduced to 30%, the tax savings drop to
30 cents on every dollar invested. Alterations regarding the
tax incentive regimes tend to have a much bigger influence,
depending on the size of the changes. To evaluate whether
changes in the tax system have a positive or negative impact
on the B-Index of a country all variables have to be taken into
account as a change in tax rates can be overcompensated by
simultaneous changes in the incentive regime.
It is also important to keep the methodology of the B-
Index and the underlying assumptions in mind when con-
sidering the calculated values. E.g. for Canada and Switzer-
land, sub-national fiscal R&D incentives are disregarded,
which tends to result in an overestimate for the respective
B-Indices. In turn, where companies are bound by ceilings,
B-Indices might be overestimated. In addition, the B-Index
only includes input-oriented R&D incentives. Countries that
do not offer tax credits, super deductions, accelerated de-
preciation or reductions of wage withholding taxes might
incentivize corporate R&D activity with other measures, like
direct grants or output-oriented measures.
All in all, over the years a significant increase in the gen-
erosity of input-oriented fiscal R&D incentives can be ob-
served across all cost types. Due to the negative effect of
depreciation rules, the values of the B-Indices for buildings
and machinery and equipment lie above the values of the B-
Indices for labor and other current costs. The majority of
countries have an overall B-Index below 1. Within the sam-
ple, the development of the B-Indices is subject to sizable
variations. This applies to comparisons across time as well
as across countries. The B-Indices remain roughly constant
over time only for a small fraction of the countries consid-
ered, where most of those countries do not offer any input-
oriented R&D incentive at all.
4. Quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of fiscal R&D
incentives
4.1. Literature review
Input-oriented R&D tax incentives have existed for a long
time, therefore numerous empirical studies have been con-
37Please also refer to Table A - 1 and the related notes in the appendix.
ducted that investigate their effects and effectiveness with
regards to the promotion of R&D investment. Among those,
a few use the B-Index introduced by Warda (2001) as a main
independent variable of interest.
Guellec and de la Potterie (2000) investigate the effect
of several measures of government funding, among them the
B-Index as a proxy for fiscal incentives. Their study covers
17 countries for the 1983-96 period. They find a significant
negative impact of the B-Index on privately funded R&D. The
negative impact increases with a one-year time lag. However,
the effect gets substantially smaller and insignificant for a
time lag of two and more years. They conclude that fiscal
incentives have a rather short-term impact.
Falk (2006) studies the factors influencing business-
sector R&D intensity in a panel of 21 OECD countries from
the time period 1975 to 2002. As dependent variable, he
uses five-year averages of the total expenditure on R&D in
the business sector as a percentage of GDP, aggregated at
country level. The B-Index as a measure for the overall
generosity of R&D tax incentives is included as one of the
main independent variables of interest. He finds significant
negative effects of the B-Index on R&D expenditure in the
business sector. This indicates that an increase in the gen-
erosity of fiscal R&D incentives (which leads to a decrease in
the B-Index) leads to an increase in the amount companies
spend on R&D investment, especially in the longer term.
In a study analyzing firm-level data for Spanish compa-
nies based on a 2002 survey, Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros
(2010) investigate the effectiveness of fiscal R&D incentives
in Spain. R&D spending over sales represent the dependent
variable, R&D technological effort. The independent vari-
able B-Index approximates the benefits a firm expects from
its R&D investment. They show that the fiscal R&D incen-
tives have a positive effect on R&D technological effort, with
significant values for large firms.
Ernst and Spengel (2011) conduct a study covering 19
EU-countries plus Norway for the time period of 1998 to
2007 and firm-level data on patent applications. They use
the number of patent applications to approximate the firm-
specific scale of R&D investment. The yearly B-Indices are
calculated for each country as a measure for the tax incen-
tives in the R&D phase. For a binary choice whether to invest
in R&D or not, they find a significant negative effect of the
B-Index, i.e. a positive effect of fiscal R&D incentives in the
investment probability.
Westmore (2013) carries out a macro-economic study
that includes 19 OECD countries for the time period of 1983
to 2008. When investigating the relationship between busi-
ness R&D expenditure (aggregated at country-level) and the
B-Index he finds a significant negative effect. The impact is
found to be substantially larger in the long run compared to
the short run.
In summary, all studies find a significant negative impact
of the B-Index on R&D investment. The empirical evidence
therefore indicates that input-oriented fiscal R&D incentives
increase the amount companies invest in their R&D projects.
Output-oriented R&D incentives started to grow in popular-
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ity over the last decade. Given the rather brief period of time
IP boxes existed, empirical evidence on their effects is rare.
Studies in this field mostly concentrate on the relationship
of IP boxes and the number of patent applications as well
as the location of patents. Ernst and Spengel (2011) find a
negative effect of tax rates on the number of patent appli-
cations and suggest that decreasing tax rates will lead to in-
creasing patent applications. Bradley et al. (2015) also find
a significant increase in patent applications after the intro-
duction of IP boxes. However, they note that a major part
of this development could be tied to the patenting of already
existing innovations that had not been patented before (as
opposed to new innovations). Evers et al. (2015) find that IP
boxes lead to a substantial reduction in effective average tax
rates (EATRs) and, depending on the design, reduce the cost
of capital of R&D projects. However, they suggest that the
incentivisation to increase real R&D investment may be ob-
structed by tax planning strategies via the movement of mere
book profits. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) suggest that, over-
all, multinationals tend to locate patents in low-tax countries.
This finding is supported by Griffith et al. (2014), who add
that the sensitivity to tax policy changes varies depending on
the country. To the best of my knowledge, there currently
exists no empirical evidence that IP boxes have a significant
effect on R&D investment.38
4.2. Empirical data and descriptive statistics
As described above, the purpose of this section is to inves-
tigate the effect of fiscal R&D incentives on R&D investment.
Therefore, R&D expenditure is established as the dependent
variable. The data stems from the Research and Development
Statistics from the OECD Database. In this dataset, R&D ex-
penditure is aggregated at the country-level and displayed
in different segments. For the analysis, business enterprise
R&D expenditure (BERD) by industry and by type of cost is
used, denoted in 2010 dollars with constant prices and pur-
chasing power parity (PPP)39. The total BERD is sub-divided
into six industry sectors: firstly agriculture, hunting, forestry
and fishing (from here on denoted as agriculture), secondly
mining and quarrying (from here on denoted as mining),
thirdly manufacturing, fourthly electricity, gas and water sup-
ply (from here on denoted as electricity), fifthly construction
and lastly services sector.40 This data is complemented by
BERD by industry by main activity, applying the same denota-
tion as the basis data set. Where missing values were added,
I checked that the numbers that were available in both data
sets for the respective countries matched. The data on BERD
by industry is collected for 34 different countries over the
period 1991-2014.
38See also see De Rassenfosse (2015), p. 15, Alstadsæter et al. (2015),
pp. 2-3.
39PPPs eliminate the effects of different price levels between countries, see
OECD (2007).
40The classification of economic activities into industries follows ISIC Rev.
3.1.
The first main variable of interest are input-oriented fiscal
R&D incentives, represented by the B-Index. This methodol-
ogy is also used in other empirical studies to measure input-
oriented fiscal R&D incentives, e.g Falk (2006), Corchuelo
and Martínez-Ros (2010), Ernst and Spengel (2011), West-
more (2013) and Bösenberg and Egger (2017). The particu-
lar values used in the analysis are those calculated based on
the methodology presented in the preceding chapters.41 A
decrease in the B-Index represents more generous tax incen-
tives, therefore I expect an increase in R&D investment.
The second main variable of interest are output-oriented
fiscal R&D incentives, represented by a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if an IP box regime exists and the value
of 0 otherwise. Table 2 in chapter 3.1 is used as basis for the
dummy variable. In line with the existing empirical literature
already mentioned in the preceding chapter, I do not expect
significant effects of IP boxes on R&D expenditure.
Several country-specific control variables are applied.
Firstly, the corporate income tax rates (CIT) control for the
location decision of MNEs, as applied by Ernst and Spengel
(2011). The CIT stems from the OECD Tax Database, Table
II.1. The tax rates used in the analysis are combined cor-
porate income tax rates which include central and regional
statutory tax rates. As especially for the period 1991 to 1999
not all tax rates are available, the data is complemented with
tax rates provided by the IBFD in its annual European Tax
Handbook. As higher tax burdens decrease the capital avail-
able for investment, a negative effect on R&D investment is
expected.
GDP per capita is used as a control for living standard,
following Lederman and Maloney (2003) who found that a
higher level of development is associated with more R&D in-
vestment. The relevant data is taken from the National Ac-
counts from the OECD database. The GDP per head is de-
noted in 2010 dollars with constant prices and PPP.42
The population controls for country size, as applied by
Ernst et al. (2014). The numbers were taken from the es-
timates of the total population by major area, region and
country in the 2015 Revision of World Population Prospects
provided by the UN Population Division.43
The number of students enrolled in tertiary education di-
vided by population covers effects from human capital, as
suggested by Bebczuk (2002). The required data on stu-
dents is provided by the OECD Education and Skills Database
where students enrolled by type of institution are accounted
for up to 2012. The data on population stems from the UN,
as already explained above. A higher level of human capital
is expected to be associated with more R&D investment.
To account for property protection,44 the property index
of the index of economic freedom, provided by the Heritage
41Please refer to Table A - 4 in the appendix.
42Availableunderhttps://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSe
tCode=GERD_FUNDS.
43Availableunderhttps://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Stan
dard/Population/.
44See e.g. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) that also use the index of economic
freedom as a control variable.
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Foundation, is included.45 The index appoints a score from
0 (private property is outlawed) to 100 (private property is
guaranteed and protected)46 to each country and is avail-
able for the years 1995 to 2014 in the sample. As the index
varies only marginally, the values appointed in the earliest
year available are assumed for the preceding years for the
purpose of the analysis. The protection of property rights,
which also includes intellectual property, guarantees a com-
pany the possibility to exploit the results of its investment.
Therefore, a positive effect of property protection on R&D
investment is expected.
In addition, year- and country-fixed effects are included.
In Table 4, the variables are summarized. With a sample
of 34 countries over a period of 24 years, a maximum of 816
observations can be reached for each variable. The regression
is mainly limited by the data for R&D expenditure, with only
576 observations for total R&D expenditure and even less
observations if sub-divided into the industries. The values
differ considerably across countries and time, especially for
the total, manufacturing and services sector. Due to the high
numbers a logarithm is applied for purpose of the analysis.
The total B-Indices range between 0.936 and 1.179, with the
values for the B-Indices for machinery and equipment and
buildings being considerably higher than for labor and other
current costs. Since the availability of data on CITs limits the
number of B-Index that can be calculated, the variables have
an equal amount of observations.
4.3. Estimation strategy
To capture the effect fiscal R&D incentives on R&D invest-
ments, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is applied.
The estimating equation is given by
ln(R&Dtotal)i t =β1 ∗ BIndex totali t + β2 ∗ I PBox i t
+ β3 ∗ C ITi t + β4 ∗ ln(GDPpCap)i t
+ β5 ∗ ln(Populat ion)i t
+ β6 ∗ StudentsspCapi t
+ β7 ∗ Proper t yProtect ioni t
+αi +λt + εi t
(13)
where subscript i denotes the ith country (i = 1, . . . ,
34) and subscript t denotes the tth period (t = 1, . . . ,
24). R&D_totali t is the aggregated business sector R&D
expenditure in country i in year t. If particular industries
are considered, in formula 13 R&D_totali t is replaced by
R&D_agriculturei t , R&D_miningi t , R&D_manufacturingi t ,
R&D_electricityi t , R&D_constructioni t and R&D_servicesectori t .
B_Index_totali t represents the generosity of input-oriented
fiscal R&D incentives. If particular expenditure types are
45Available under http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=
by-region-country-year. This index was used to account for property
protection as the more widely used Ginarte-Park index of patent rights is
only available up to 2005, see Park (2008).
46See Heritage Foundation (2017).
considered, B_Index_totali t is replaced by B_Index_MEi t ,
B_Index_Bi t , B_Index_Li t and B_Index_OCi t . IP_Boxi t de-
notes a dummy for the existence or absence of IP box
regimes in a given country i and year t. CITi t , GDPpCapi t ,
Populationi t , StudentspCapi t and PropertyProtectioni t ac-
count for the control variables listed in Table 4. The terms
αi and λt are country- and time-fixed effects respectively. εi t
denotes white noise.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Baseline results
Table 5 presents the main regression results by industry
sector. For each sector, the regression is run three times: In
the first and second column, the total B-index and the IP
box dummy are regressed separately, each time only with
country- and year-fixed effects. In the third column, both
main independent variable of interest are regressed, this time
with the full set of control variables.
Consistent with past studies, the results suggest a nega-
tive effect of the B-Index on R&D investment. The effects are
significant at the 5%-level for total BERD and in the services
sector and at the 10%-level in the manufacturing sector. In
the other four sectors the relationship is insignificant. This
indicates that sectors matter with regards to the effects of
input-oriented fiscal R&D incentives. Similarly, Castellacci
and Lie (2015) find in their meta-study that, compared to
other sectors, R&D investment in the services sector increases
at a significantly higher rate in response to the introduction
of tax credits. They argue that companies in the services sec-
tor have in general a lower R&D intensity, thus it is easier for
them to increase their R&D investment compared to compa-
nies that already maintain a high R&D expenditure level.
Quantitatively, the β1 of -0.87 in case of total R&D expen-
diture indicates that a reduction in the B-Index by 0.10 (i.e. a
1 dollar investment in R&D has to earn 10 cent lower pre-tax
income to reach the break-even point) increases total BERD
by 8.7%. On the industry level, the effects have similar mag-
nitudes with an expected increase in industry-specific BERD
of 8.8% and 7.9% in the manufacturing and the services sec-
tor, respectively. In comparison, Guellec and de la Potterie
(2000) and Falk (2006) find substantially lower short-run
elasticities of -0.16 and -0.22, respectively. Both use older
time periods (1983-1996 and 1975-2002, respectively) and
fewer countries (17 and 21, respectively). Therefore, the dif-
ference could be attributed to the more recent and extended
sample. The insignificant effects for IP boxes are in line with
the expectations. It suggests that the introduction of IP box
regimes indeed has no influence on the level of business R&D
expenditure in a country. Alstadsæter et al. (2015) list several
possible reasons. For one, the award of successfully patented
innovations discriminates commercially less exploitable but
socially potentially more advantageous research. In addition,
patent box regimes do not link the tax savings to R&D invest-
ment.47
47See Alstadsæter et al. (2015), p. 3.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics; Notes: "log" indicates that the variable is put in natural logarithm in the regression.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Scale
R&D Exp (in 2010 dollars, constant prices
and PPPs)
- Total 567 18,290.350 44,222.330 17.726 296,465.700 log
- Agriculture 391 49.104 74.518 0.003 418.099 log
- Mining 373 140.238 371.693 0.013 3,005.693 log
- Manufacturing 506 15,030.340 34,253.330 11.617 208,018.900 log
- Electricity 414 134.320 200.827 0.031 1,025.707 log
- Construction 403 181.569 372.681 0.034 1,888.687 log
- Services 497 4,148.760 12,941.800 3.244 95,258.890 log
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Scale
B-Index
- Total 785 0.936 0.126 0.473 1.179
- ME 785 1.011 0.143 0.437 1.267
- B 785 1.243 0.186 0.714 1.827
- L 785 0.912 0.138 0.335 1.199
- OC 785 0.921 0.133 0.429 1.199
IP box (Dummy Variable) 816 0.098 0.298 0.000 1.000
CIT (0 - 1 scale) 785 0.310 0.081 0.125 0.582
GDP per capita (in 2010 dollars, constant
prices and PPPs)
805 31,718.690 13,637.680 1,601.623 90,628.360 log
Population (in thousands) 816 70,300.000 218,000.000 257.387 1,370,000.000 log
Students in tert. education per capita 648 0.238 0.038 0.001 0.349
Property Protection Index (0 - 100 scale) 816 77.249 16.519 20.000 95.000
There is mixed evidence on the relationship between the
R&D expenditure and the CIT of a country. In the manu-
facturing sector, the results suggest a positive effect, while
in the electricity sector a strong negative impact, which was
originally expected, is found. Nevertheless, both effects are
only significant at the 10%-level. For the log GDP per capita
and the number of students in tertiary education per capita,
significant positive effects are only found in the manufactur-
ing sector. The direction of the effect is consistent with the
expectations in both cases. However, the results in the other
sectors show mixed algebraic signs for the two variables. The
log population is significantly positively related to BERD as
well for the total across sectors as for three out of the six sec-
tors. In case of the total R&D expenditure the results is even
significant on a 1%-level. As for the property protection in-
dex, the results show a rather small significant positive rela-
tionship on a 10%-level in the agriculture sector, the effect is
insignificant and also small in all other sectors.
In every sector, the adjusted R-squared shows that the es-
timation improves when the control variables are added. In
the specification with the total business-financed R&D invest-
ment as well as BERD in the manufacturing and the services
sector, the values lie between 56% and 75%. However, in
the other four of the industries (agriculture, mining, electric-
ity, construction), the adjusted R-squared is low in compari-
son, amounting to values between 6% and 17% with controls
added. This seems to indicate that in the four industries men-
tioned other influences exist that have not been included in
the analysis. Significant effects of fiscal R&D incentives are
only observed in the two sectors where the explained vari-
ance is comparably high. It might be possible that, by con-
trolling for the missing influence factors in the four sectors
mentioned above, significant results can be obtained in more
sectors. Determining those control variables remains a ques-
tion for future research.
Overall, the results suggest that input-oriented fiscal R&D
incentives have a significant negative impact on R&D invest-
ment. The magnitude of those effects seems to depend on the
respective industries. I did not find significant effects with re-
gards to output-oriented fiscal R&D incentives, i.e. IP boxes.
4.4.2. Extended analysis
To consider the case that companies only react over time
to newly introduced R&D incentives, I repeated the regres-
sion with a lagged BERD. The repetitions were conducted
with a lag of one, two and five years (Table 6).
First, the magnitude and significance of the effects de-
creased with time. In case of the 1-year-lag, the significantly
negative effect for BERD in total and in the services sector
decreases, the significantly negative effect in the manufactur-
ing sector vanishes. The results for total BERD contrast with
Guellec and de la Potterie (2000), where the negative effect
nearly doubles with a one-year-lag compared to the specifi-
cation with no lag; both times having a significance level of
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Table 6: Regression results for total B-Index by industry sector (lagged BERD); Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10, 5 and 1% level.
Industry Sector Controls no lag 1 year lag 2 year lag 5 year lag
Total -0.59 -0.46 -0.38 -0.46
x -0.87** -0.78* -0.69 -0.41
Agrar -0.98 -1.17 -1.48 -0.64
x -0.67 -0.75 -1.15 -0.81
Mining 0.35 -0.12 -0.56 -2.13*
x 0.46 0.24 -0.12 -1.24
Manufacturing -0.70 -0.54 -0.48 -0.70
x -0.88* -0.77 -0.68 -0.76
Electricity 0.01 -0.65 -0.80 -1.31*
x -0.18 -0.89 -0.73 -1.19*
Construction -0.07 -0.61 -0.80 -1.57
x 0.29 -0.48 -0.32 -1.25
Services -1.07** -0.89* -0.71 -0.28
x -0.79** -0.79** -0.61 -0.01
1%. In their study they do not differentiate between indus-
try sectors. In case of the two-year-lag, the results did not
show any significant relationship, which now is in line with
the findings of Guellec and de la Potterie (2000).
Guellec and de la Potterie (2000) do not find any signif-
icant effect of the B-Index on total private R&D expenditure
with a four-year-lag. Again, this matches my results for total
BERD in the regression with a lag of five years. In contrast,
the results indicate negative effects in the mining and elec-
tricity sector, al-though only significant at a 10%-level. Inter-
estingly, in those two sectors no significant impact was found
in the original setting. With a β1 of -2.13 (without controls)
and -1.19, respectively, the effects are larger compared to the
values found for the specification without a lagged variable.
This is in line with Bloom et al. (2002), Falk (2006) and West-
more (2013) which all find larger long-run elasticities com-
pared to the short-run elasticities. However, they only con-
sider total BERD and do not differentiate between industry
sectors.
All in all, the time horizon considered seems to be an im-
portant variable, too. Companies in the manufacturing and
the services sector seem to react quickly to new incentives,
while companies in the mining and the electricity sector need
some time to adjust. However, especially when interpreting
the results under consideration of a longer period in time it
has to be kept in mind that fiscal R&D incentives are subject
to change. Only some countries like Canada or the USA ap-
plied their incentive scheme constantly over more than ten
years while for example Spain changed its system every few
years.
In a third part of the analysis, I regressed the B-Indices
that were calculated for the different cost types on total BERD
(Table 7). In addition, the relationship of the B-Indices is
investigated with respect to the R&D expenditure in the in-
dustry sectors that showed significant effects in the first part
of the analysis, the manufacturing sector (Table 8) and the
services sector (Table 9).
The results indicate that the generosity of R&D incentives
targeted at other current costs has a significant positive effect
in all three cases considered, with a magnitude between -0.86
and -1.26 depending on the specification of the regression. In
case of the total BERD displayed in Table 7, the B-Indices for
the other three cost types show no significant effects. Overall,
the tax incentives targeted at other current costs like energy
or administration costs seem to have the most impact.
This appears to be reasonable, as they account for around
30% of a company’s total expenditure. Since the B-Indices
are regressed on total BERD, changes in the tax system that
affect other current costs will have a larger effect on the to-
tal investment than changes that affect expenditure on ma-
chinery and equipment or buildings. Therefore, it might be
interesting to repeat the analysis with data on R&D expendi-
ture differentiated by expenditure type. However, consider-
ing this explanation it is noticeable that tax incentives target-
ing labor expenditure, which accounts for around 60%, yield
insignificant results. Another possible reason could be that,
in the short run, it might be easier to increase other current
costs compared to capital expenditure and employment.
Comparing the R&D expenditure in the manufacturing
(Table 8) and the services sector (Table 9) yields mentionable
results: In the manufacturing sector the B-Index for machin-
ery and equipment has, in addition to the B-Index for other
current costs, a significant negative effect on a 5%-level. On
the other hand, in the services sector the B-Index for labor
has a significant negative effect on a 10%-level. The B-Index
for other current costs shows significant negative effects at
a 1%-level when the control variables are omitted and at a
5%-level when the control variables are included.
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Following the preceding argumentation, this occurrence
could be based on the composition of the total BERD in the
respective sectors. While the distribution of expenditure for
machinery and equipment and buildings (5%, respectively),
labor expenditure (60%) and other current costs (30%) is
representative on an overall basis, there might be differences
in-between sectors. For example, in the manufacturing sector
expenditure on machinery and equipment could make up a
larger proportion, whereas in the services sector salaries and
wages could account for a greater share. As a result, the im-
portance of R&D incentives targeted at the respective expen-
diture types would differ depending on the industry sector.
To summarize, the effect of output-oriented fiscal R&D
incentives seems to depend on the type of cost the incentive
applies to. The B-Index for other current costs is significant
in the case of total BERD as well as R&D investment in the
manufacturing and the services sector. The B-Indices for ma-
chinery and equipment and labor show a significant effect
only for the manufacturing and the services sector, respec-
tively.
The regressions in part one to three were also conducted
with openness as an additional control variable. It is cal-
culated as the sum of imports and exports in goods divided
by GDP. The variable was dropped since it did not yield any
significant impact in the regression. In the empirical liter-
ature, the importance and sign of openness is ambiguous.
Bebczuk (2002) suggests a negative influence. On the other
hand Falk (2006) finds positive but statistically insignificant
effects while a study conducted by Ernst and Spengel (2011)
results in significant positive effects for part of the specifica-
tions.
5. Conclusion
This thesis investigates the effect fiscal R&D incentives
have on R&D investment. Input-oriented incentives have a
long history and are widely spread. Output-oriented incen-
tives are not as common but grew in popularity over the last
decade. Both types of R&D incentives are characterized by a
wide variety of possible designs. To compare the generosity
of input-oriented fiscal R&D incentives, the B-Index method-
ology was introduced. Like the underlying incentives, the
B-Indices vary greatly across countries and over time.
In the empirical analysis, the effects the B-Index and IP
boxes have on R&D expenditure, differentiated by industries,
are investigated for a sample of 34 countries from 1991 to
2014. Other factors included are living standard, market
size, human capital and property protection.
The main results can be summarized as follows. While
there are no indications that output-oriented fiscal R&D in-
centives influence R&D investment in a country, significant
positive effects are found for the input-oriented fiscal R&D
incentives. The magnitude of the influence seems to depend
on the industry observed as well as the time horizon con-
sidered. A reduction in the B-Index by 0.10 increases total
BERD by 8.7%, BERD in the manufacturing sector by 8.8%
and BERD in the services sector by 7.9%. When introducing
lagged BERD as the dependent variable, the results suggest
that companies in the manufacturing and services sector re-
act within one or two years to changes in the B-Index. Com-
panies in the mining and the electricity sector seem to take
a longer period of time to adjust their R&D investment. An-
other relevant factor is the type of cost the incentives apply
to. While the B-Index for other current costs is significant in
all specifications, the B-Indices for machinery and equipment
and labor are only significant in the manufacturing and the
services sector, respectively.
As this study is conducted on an aggregated county level,
the estimated effects presented are averages. The effect of
fiscal R&D incentives seems to differ depending on the in-
dustry. Future research using firm level data could further in-
vestigate this relationship with respect to firm size and other
specifications. In this setting, it might also yield interesting
results to introduce lagged variables or to differentiate be-
tween types of costs.
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